Does Trade Prevent War?or Prepare the Ground for It?
- Reading the Political Economy of Security Through Factories, Supply Chains, Markets, and Businesses
The course of a war begins to change long before the first shot is fired. What a country produces, whom it trades with, and which supply chains it depends on reshape its power and available choices. It is time to unfold the economic map of security?the one that cannot be seen on a military map alone.
[Key Message]
* War begins before the first shot is fired. A country’s productive capacity, technology, energy systems, and logistics networks are security assets as important as its weapons. Industrial and supply-chain choices made in ordinary times determine the options available during a crisis.
* Trade can be both a bond of peace and a weapon of pressure. Mutual commerce raises the cost of war, but uneven dependence creates a channel for economic coercion. The critical question is not simply how much two countries trade, but which side suffers more if the relationship is severed.
* An efficient supply chain is not necessarily a secure one. The cheapest supplier and leanest inventory may reduce ordinary costs while creating a fatal bottleneck during disruption. Businesses must manage substitutability and resilience alongside price and delivery.
* No single formula explains the relationship between economics and security. Economic growth and globalization can stabilize societies while also creating conditions for resource competition, terrorism, and civil conflict. Analysis must separate the specific pathways and conditions operating between cause and outcome.
* Businesses are security actors, not spectators of geopolitics. Decisions about production locations, trading partners, technology transfers, and data storage reshape patterns of dependence between countries. Supply-chain strategy has become both cost management and economic-security strategy.
***
Money and Factories Move Before the Guns
When people think of war, they first picture tanks, fighter jets, missiles, and uniformed soldiers. Yet firing a weapon on the battlefield requires factories that manufacture ammunition, and those factories require electricity, raw materials, engineers, and transportation networks. Once soldiers’ wages, food, medicine, and communications are included, security becomes an economic matter from the outset. Behind every dazzling weapons system lies a less visible world of contracts, production lines, taxes, and government bonds.
The strength displayed by the United States during World War II did not rest solely on combat technology. Factories that had produced automobiles and home appliances were converted into facilities for manufacturing tanks, aircraft, and military vehicles. Detroit’s automobile industry became known as the “Arsenal of Democracy,” and its immense industrial capacity translated into a military advantage for the Allied powers. The ability to produce the right things quickly determined how long a country could sustain a war.
The situation is more complicated today. Weapons belonging to one country are rarely manufactured entirely within its borders. A single fighter jet can contain semiconductors, sensors, rare metals, and software produced in several countries. Satellite communications systems rely on technologies developed by private space companies, while military drones often incorporate commercial components. It has become increasingly difficult to draw a clean line between civilian and defense industries or between domestic production and overseas supply chains.
The formula commonly used to connect economic power with security is simple. A wealthy country can spend more on defense, and greater defense spending can produce stronger military power. Yet economic factors influence security through more than one route. International trade, domestic production structures, growth and recession, taxes and public debt, businesses and workers, natural resources, and global supply chains all shape war and peace through different pathways. Once terrorism and civil conflict are added to interstate warfare, the network of connections becomes even more complex.
The crucial point is that the economy does not invariably produce peace, nor does it invariably cause war. The same trade relationship can serve as an adhesive for peace under one set of conditions and as a weapon of coercion under another. Economic development can stabilize society, but it can also create valuable resources and industries worth seizing, generating new conflicts. Globalization connects countries more closely while simultaneously providing channels through which one side can choke the other.
This is why security cannot be explained by a single figure such as gross domestic product or defense spending. A country may possess enormous wealth but lack the industrial base needed to convert it into military capability. It may command advanced technologies while depending excessively on a particular country for critical materials. It may be home to globally powerful corporations whose interests do not necessarily align with government strategy. Understanding the substance of security therefore requires looking not only at how wealthy a country is, but also at what it produces, how it is connected, and who influences its policies.
The Enduring Belief That Trade Preserves Peace
The idea that two countries engaged in extensive trade will find it harder to go to war is intuitively persuasive. Once war begins, factories can lose access to essential components, export markets can vanish, and financial transactions and transportation networks can grind to a halt. The greater the volume of trade, the more economic value there is to destroy. Trade carries not only goods across borders but also interests invested in preventing war.
A maxim widely associated with the French economist Frederic Bastiat conveys the idea that when goods do not cross borders, armies will. Regardless of the debate over its exact origin, the phrase distills the liberal belief linking commerce and peace. If doing business is more profitable than fighting, governments too will be forced to consult the ledger.
European integration is a leading example of this belief translated into political institutions. After fighting repeated wars, France and Germany began jointly managing coal and steel following World War II. At the time, coal and steel were not merely industrial materials; they were indispensable resources for waging war. If both countries jointly supervised the production and distribution of these resources, either side would find it harder to build up its military power in secret. Economic cooperation was designed not simply as a gesture of friendship but as an institution that reduced both the possibility and the potential gains of armed conflict.
Businesses also become stakeholders in peace. Companies that build factories overseas and sign contracts with local suppliers have little interest in seeing those supply chains severed by war. Airlines, shipping companies, financial institutions, and retailers all profit when borders remain stable and open. As economic connections grow denser, the number of domestic groups with a stake in opposing war may increase.
Trade can also improve access to information about another country. Repeated interactions among businesses, financial institutions, and government officials create additional channels for understanding the other side’s circumstances and intentions. When misunderstandings and exaggerated fears diminish, military confrontation may become less likely. Economic ties increase the cost of war while also creating channels of dialogue and improving predictability.
Yet a high level of trade cannot guarantee peace. Europe immediately before World War I had achieved a considerable degree of economic interdependence by the standards of its time. Finance and trade networks connected the continent, but political rivalry, nationalism, and tensions within the alliance system did not disappear. Anticipating economic damage and actually deciding to avoid war are two different things.
The question must therefore be reframed. Rather than asking whether trade is high or low, it may be more important to ask which side would suffer greater damage if the relationship were severed. If the losses are similar on both sides, interdependence can function as a deterrent. If one side can easily find another trading partner while the other has no alternative, however, trade is not an equal connection. It becomes an asymmetric dependency that allows one side to squeeze the other’s throat.
When Greater Interdependence Creates Greater Danger
The supply chains of globalization once appeared to be vast highways. Businesses selected the most efficient production locations and sourced components wherever they were cheapest. Just-in-time production lowered costs by minimizing inventories, while consumers gained access to a wider selection of affordable products. Yet highways contain bottlenecks as well as junctions. If a bridge that everyone must cross is blocked, all traffic comes to a halt.
Semiconductors are a representative example. It is difficult to identify a strategic industry?from smartphones and automobiles to data centers, telecommunications equipment, and advanced weapons?that does not rely on chips. Design, manufacturing equipment, materials, fabrication, and assembly are distributed among numerous countries and companies, making it difficult for any single player to command the entire process. This division of labor has improved efficiency while increasing dependence on particular companies and regions. When semiconductor supplies falter, automobile factories stop, artificial intelligence projects fall behind schedule, and defense production plans face delays.
U.S. restrictions on exports of advanced semiconductors and manufacturing equipment to China, together with China’s efforts to manage critical minerals and related technologies strategically, reveal how tightly trade and security have become intertwined. Earlier economic sanctions often targeted oil and finance. Today, high-performance chips, manufacturing equipment, software, and skilled technical personnel can all become targets of control. Factories, laboratories, patents, and data have emerged as new geopolitical front lines.
Energy provides an older example. Europe secured relatively inexpensive energy through Russian natural gas, while Russia earned substantial export revenues from European markets. The trade benefited both sides, but the degree of dependence was not symmetrical. When energy supplies became unstable following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe had to expand imports of liquefied natural gas, increase storage capacity, and diversify suppliers. What had previously appeared to be the economic benefit of cheap energy was reassessed as a security vulnerability.
Food is no exception. For grain-importing countries, a single port or shipping route can be directly tied to national stability. When war in the Black Sea region disrupted grain exports, the prices of flour and cooking oil were affected in countries far from the battlefield. When food prices surge, household burdens rise, dissatisfaction with government grows, and political instability can deepen. A confrontation on one front can spread to another continent through the price of bread and become a source of social conflict.
Pharmaceutical supply chains contain the same vulnerability. Even when finished medicines are manufactured domestically, production cannot be considered fully domestic if the active pharmaceutical ingredients come from a small number of countries. If a pandemic or conflict halts exports, inventories at hospitals and pharmacies can be depleted quickly. A decision that selected the cheapest supplier in normal times can become a security issue directly affecting human lives during a crisis.
The answer is not necessarily to shorten every supply chain or return all production home. Self-sufficiency may appear stable, but it can raise production costs and slow innovation. Complete separation from foreign companies and markets may leave fewer alternatives available during a crisis. What matters is not severing connections but understanding their structure accurately. Decision-makers must identify which products are indispensable, whether alternative suppliers exist, how long inventories will last, and what costs can be absorbed if a particular country threatens to cut off supplies.
This is why resilience and security have joined efficiency in supply-chain management. The cheapest supplier is not necessarily the safest. Nor does having many suppliers offer automatic reassurance. If several suppliers depend on materials from the same country, the same port, or the same cloud service, a company’s records may show diversification even though the actual structure remains bound to a single bottleneck.
Why the Same Economy Can Produce Both Peace and War
The most dangerous temptation in examining economics and security is the search for a simple law. Statements such as “more trade means less war,” “poverty increases terrorism,” or “economic crises cause leaders to start wars” are easy to understand. World politics, however, rarely fits into a short formula.
Economic interdependence raises the cost of war, but the opposite effect can occur when political leaders expect future trade to be cut off. They may conclude that they will be in a worse position if they fail to act immediately. If another country controls a critical resource or begins pulling ahead in economic growth, leaders may fear future inferiority more than they value present peace. At that moment, trade changes from a cord preserving peace into a clock creating time pressure.
The relationship between economic distress and military action is equally complicated. The diversionary-war hypothesis?the idea that political leaders may redirect domestic discontent toward an external enemy by manufacturing a military crisis?is plausible. Rising unemployment and falling approval ratings can create an incentive to emphasize external threats and rally the public. Yet a country in economic difficulty may also struggle to obtain the money and public support required for war. Economic distress can heighten aggression while simultaneously weakening the capacity for military action.
Public attitudes are also affected by who bears the cost of war. If a government immediately finances military operations through taxation, citizens feel the cost in their wallets. If it relies instead on government borrowing or money creation, the immediate burden is less visible. This is the problem of “taxes and peace”: public support for war may differ depending on whether the price tag is displayed clearly or hidden. War is both a military decision and a political choice about how costs will be distributed and perceived.
Whether wealthy countries are more peaceful also depends on underlying conditions. Economic development can improve education and administrative capacity while giving governments greater resources to provide public services. Stable employment and confidence in the future can weaken the ability of armed groups to recruit. Abundant resources, however, do not always bring peace. If easily exported commodities such as oil or diamonds are concentrated in a particular region, competition to control them can intensify civil war. Resources can become a source of funding for armed groups rather than a foundation for shared national prosperity.
Terrorism cannot be explained by poverty alone either. Poverty can increase grievances and vulnerability, but planning, organizing, and carrying out attacks across borders require money, education, communications networks, and mobility. Economic development and globalization can reduce grievances while simultaneously supplying the means to conduct attacks. This is why domestic and transnational terrorism must be distinguished, and why income levels, economic growth, and the degree of connection to the world economy must be examined separately.
Dividing the economic influence on security into sixteen pathways is not intended to produce one sweeping answer. It is meant to deconstruct the intermediate steps through which economic causes lead to security outcomes. Opening the black box between cause and effect reveals not only trade volumes but also the direction of dependence, the interests of economic actors, the distribution of costs, production structures, and political institutions. The economy is not a switch that automatically starts or stops war. It resembles a complex transmission mechanism whose direction changes as it passes through different conditions and actors.
States Are Not the Only Actors
It is convenient to describe a country as if it were a single person. “The United States wants,” “China fears,” and “Europe chooses” are familiar formulations. In reality, however, a state contains government departments, businesses, labor unions, consumers, and local communities making different calculations. The same policy can benefit one group while costing another its jobs.
When import tariffs are raised, companies and workers in the protected industry may welcome the move. Manufacturers that rely on imported components, however, worry about higher costs. When exports of advanced technology are restricted, security officials may conclude that they have prevented the leakage of strategic capabilities, while companies worry about falling overseas sales and reduced research-and-development investment. Withdrawing factories from a particular country may reduce supply-chain risks but also raise production costs and consumer prices. Even within a policy pursued in the name of national security, costs and benefits are not distributed equally.
Restrictions on semiconductor exports to China illustrate this conflict clearly. The U.S. government seeks to prevent advanced technologies from strengthening a competitor’s military and intelligence capabilities. Semiconductor and equipment companies may cooperate with that objective while calculating the consequences of losing access to a vast market. Controls that are too narrow may prove ineffective, while excessively broad restrictions may damage the revenues and innovative capacity of domestic firms. Between security and economics lies not a clean border but a negotiating line that continually moves.
Businesses do not invariably favor peace. Exporters that profit from international markets are likely to prefer an easing of tensions. Industries that benefit from protectionism or increased defense spending may instead support tougher policies. Some companies gain market share when foreign competitors are expelled. The proposition that “business favors peace” holds only when all companies are treated as a single group. In practice, preferences differ according to industry, market, and position within the supply chain.
Citizens do not experience the cost of war equally either. Taxpayers asked to contribute more, families exposed to conscription, regions that host defense plants, and households forced to absorb higher energy prices can reach different judgments. Calculating only the total cost of war or sanctions does not reveal the likely direction of public support. It is also necessary to examine who pays, who is compensated, and when the burden becomes visible.
This perspective is equally important for corporate management. Geopolitical risk is not merely an external shock to be addressed after an international event occurs. Corporate choices involving lobbying, investment, production locations, technology transfers, and data storage also help shape national security policy. Depending on where a business sits within a supply chain, it may become a victim of policy, a beneficiary, or even a participant capable of influencing its design.
Rereading National Security Through Adam Smith
Remembering Adam Smith solely as a symbol of free markets and limited government overlooks much of his intellectual concern. Smith examined how production, specialization, and expanding markets changed the wealth of society, but he also considered national defense, public goods, and the role of the state. Commercial society could increase wealth, yet the institutions and capabilities required to protect that wealth also had to be considered.
Three questions are essential when interpreting economics and security. How do economic objectives relate to security objectives? Which economic factors deserve attention among the many available? How do businesses and other economic actors influence security policy?
The first question leads to the enduring choice between “guns and butter.” Increasing defense spending can leave less money for welfare, education, and infrastructure. Yet defense expenditure does not always represent economic sacrifice alone. Military research and development can spread into civilian technologies, while a stable security environment can encourage investment and trade. Conversely, a country that pursues growth while allowing dependence on critical industries and resources to deepen may face larger security costs later. Economics and security are not fixed weights on a scale where choosing one makes the other disappear. The point of balance shifts continually with time and circumstances.
The second question directs attention toward domestic and international economic structures. Aggregate indicators such as gross domestic product and trade volume are not enough. It is necessary to examine what the economy primarily produces, where technology and capital are concentrated, whether critical components can be sourced domestically, and who controls supply-chain bottlenecks. Seizing a factory does not automatically deliver its patents, data, skilled engineers, or global collaboration network. In a knowledge-intensive economy, the benefits available through territorial conquest may be smaller than they were in the past.
The third question prevents governments from being treated as unitary actors detached from society. Policymakers face pressure from companies, workers, voters, and bureaucratic organizations. At the same time, governments possess their own security objectives and privileged information. Realism emphasizes state autonomy and competition for power, whereas liberal political economy pays greater attention to the interests of social groups and the role of institutions. Rather than discarding one perspective, the task is to identify the conditions under which the state takes the lead and those under which pressure from economic actors becomes stronger.
These three questions open a passage between the optimism that economics produces peace and the pessimism that economics is merely an instrument of power politics. Free trade, too, cannot simply be classified as good or bad. Its outcome depends on the structure of market connections, the power of participants, the availability of alternatives, and the political purposes involved. What is needed is not a slogan for or against trade, but an analysis of the pathways through which it actually operates.
In the Age of Supply Chains, Businesses Are Security Actors Too
Supply-chain meetings once revolved around three questions: price, quality, and delivery. Now an expanding list of additional questions must be asked. Could the country of production become the target of sanctions? Is there an alternative means of transport if a shipping route is blocked? Which country’s laws govern the cloud and telecommunications networks being used? Do components contain technologies subject to export controls? Where do the suppliers’ own suppliers obtain their raw materials?
Marking factory locations on a map is not enough to identify risk. A Korean company may assemble products at a plant in Vietnam while sourcing critical materials from China, manufacturing equipment from Japan or Europe, and design software from the United States. The country where the finished product is manufactured may differ from the true structure of dependence. The more revealing question is not “Where is it made?” but “What single interruption could stop the entire production process?”
This is also changing the view of inventory as pure waste. In ordinary times, minimal inventory improves capital efficiency. During a crisis, however, even a few days of stock can determine how long a company survives. Adding suppliers may increase costs, but the expense can be understood as an insurance premium if it reduces single points of failure. Reshoring and friend-shoring?moving production home or into allied countries?are likewise attempts to recalculate costs and risks, not merely patriotic slogans.
Reorganizing every supply chain around security considerations creates another set of problems. Higher production costs are passed on to consumers, while divided markets weaken economies of scale. Reduced profits can limit investment in research and development, potentially undermining long-term technological competitiveness. Even supply chains centered on allies are not free from political disagreements. Policies must avoid the paradox of weakening the economic foundation while attempting to strengthen economic security.
What business leaders need is not geopolitical prophecy. Accurately predicting when and where the next conflict will occur is nearly impossible. What they can do is identify where losses would multiply after a shock. They can assess in advance how export controls imposed by a particular country would affect production and sales, how long replacing a critical component would take, how exposed major customers are to sanctions, and which regulations apply when technology and data move across borders.
The same principle applies to governments. Rather than bringing every form of production home, they must distinguish industries that must be protected from those that can safely be left to markets. Alliances can also expand beyond military cooperation to encompass technology standards, joint investment, strategic stockpiles, and supply-chain coordination. Treating every economic connection as a danger increases the cost of isolation; interpreting every connection as benevolent leaves a country vulnerable to coercion.
A container ship crossing national borders is evidence of peace and a potential instrument of pressure at the same time. A semiconductor plant is both a growth industry and a strategic asset. A corporate purchasing contract is both a cost-saving tool and an act that designs dependence between countries. This is why economics and security should not be separated by a line. The pathways through which they meet must be traced one by one.
War does not suddenly invade the economy from somewhere outside it. The conditions that deter or encourage conflict accumulate gradually through choices made in ordinary times about production methods, trading relationships, taxation, investment, and technology policy. Long before gunfire is heard, the direction of security is already being decided in factories, ports, laboratories, and boardrooms.